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ABSTRACT
Until the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Com-
munist Party exerted a strict control of access to and dissem-
ination of scientific and technical information (STI). This
article presents models of the Soviet-style information soci-
ety and the Western-style information society and discusses
the effects of centralized governmental control of informa-
tion on Russian technical communication practices. The
effects of political control on technical communication are
then used to interpret the results of a survey of Russian
and U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists concerning the
time devoted to technical communication, their collaborative
writing practices and their attitudes toward collaboration,
the kinds of technical documents they produce and use, and
their use of computer technology, and their use of and the
importance to them of libraries and technical information
centers. The data are discussed in terms of tentative conclu-
sions drawn from the literature. Finally, we conclude with
four questions concerning government policy, collaboration,
and the flow of STI between Russian and U.S. aerospace
engineers and scientists.
INTRODUCTION
Until the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Com-
munist Party maintained strict control over the intranational
and international dissemination of scientific and technical
information (STI). Russian engineers and scientists worked
within a highly centralized political system characterized by
secrecy and distrust. This system actively restricted commu-
nication between Russian engineers and scientists and their
professional counterparts both at home and abroad.
Although sweeping political changes may free up the flow
of STI within the former Soviet Union, it would be a mistake
to discount the working environment that has prevailed in
Soviet science since 1917 [1, 148]. Information flow and the
use of products, services, and technologies for acquiring, pro-
ducing, using, and disseminating STI have traditionally been
constrained by government policies formulated to maintain
order and control [2, 537]. It will take time before the ef-
fects of an easing of restrictions on the use of STI are felt by
and can influence the communication practices of Russian
engineers and scientists.
In addition to a sociopolitical climate that has hampered
the flow of STI, infrastructural obstacles to free and open
communication exist, such as the poor quality of Russian
telecommunications and severe shortages of basic supplies.
Reports on the current state of the Russian economy indi-
cate that such problems can only be addressed gradually.
Therefore, information on the sociopolitical and economic
climate over the last few decades is relevant when assessing
the technical communication practices of engineers and sci-
entists whose education and careers have been shaped by the
highly centralized character of the Communist Party's rule.
To learn more about international technical communica-
tion practices, the A'Ab'A/DoD Arrosp_lr_ h,_ow#d_l_ I)if-
fusio, R_searcb Projecl is examining how aerospace engi-
neers and scientists find and use STI. This 4-phase research
project is a joint effort of the Indiana University Center for
Survey Research and the NASA Langley Research Center.
The project is providing information on the flow of scien-
tific and technical information at the individual, organiza-
tional, national, and international levels that should prove
useful to research and development (R&D) managers, in-
formation managers, and others concerned with improving
access to and use of STI [3]. Studies for Phase 4 have been
conducted in the Union of Socialist Republics (the former
Soviet Union), Israel, Japan, and several Western European
countries to examine the information-seeking behaviors of
non-U.S, aerospace engineers and scientists.
The Russian study offers a unique opportunity to exam-
ine the influence of the past regime at a time when Russia
is opening up to international communication and freer ex-
change of STI. The former Soviet Union is beginning to play
a greater role in the international scientific community, par-
ticularly in the area of joint commercial ventures [4, 42].
For example, Krunichev Enterprises, the Russian firm that
developed the Proton launch vehicle, and Lockheed Missiles
and Space, a subsidiary of the Lockheed Corporation, re-
cently announced a joint venture to pursue work in the in-
ternational commercial satellite market [5]. The findings of
this study, therefore, may hold particular interest for the
American engineers and scientists who will find themselves
working on joint projects with their Russian counterparts in
the not-so-distant future.
Although considerable research has been done on Soviet
science and technology policy and education, few studies
have focused on the types of documents used and produced
by engineers and scientists or on the level and nature of
collaboration involved in the production of scientific and
technical documents. A wide range of sources, including
reports from emigre scientists, indicates that two key factors
have influenced Russian technical communication: (1) severe
restrictionsonthedisseminationf STIand(2) limited
computingfacilities.
Inthispaper,wepresentSovietandWestern-styleinfor-
mationmodelsand discuss the characteristics of R_D in the
Soviet Union to provide a conceptual framework for under-
standing the differences between technical communication
patterns in Russia and the U.S. We believe that Soviet cen-
tralized control of information has played a key role in shap-
ing the communication behaviors of Russian engineers and
scientists. Next we examine the results of our survey of Rus-
sian and U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists in the light
of what we have learned about information control in the
former Soviet Union. Finally, we present tentative conclu-
sions and close with four questions concerning government
policy, collaboration, and the flow of STI between Russian
and U.S. engineers and scientists.
MODELS OF SOVIET AND W'ESTER-N-STYLE
COMMUNICATIONS
In examining the national presence of information tech-
nologies in the Soviet Union and the West, Goodman
presents comparative models of '_nformation societies" [6,
15]. Information in general and STI in particular have been
viewed in the Soviet Union as a means of achieving centrally
formulated goals that include increased industrial produc-
tivity, support of military and internal security needs, and
improved economic planning and control mechanisms. The
driving forces behind Soviet goals have been national level
political processes and Western achievements. The systemic
conditions underlying information production, transfer, and
use include a leadership that distrusts the general popula-
tion, a strong form of centralized planning and control, gov-
ernment controls on access to and dissemination of informa-
tion, and powerful national-level controls on social change.
Communication and computing capabilities remain mod-
est and narrowly related to specific, government-mandated
goals.
In the West in general and in the U.S. in particular, infor-
mation is regarded as a commodity, and information tech-
nologies are viewed as part of a large number of products,
services, and processes to be distributed throughout society.
Driving forces in the West include push-pull markets, domes-
tic and international competition, and inherent opportuni-
ties for innovations in information technologies. Systemic
conditions in the West support the broad dissemination of
controls for economic efficiency, private activities, and more
communications of all kinds. National controls on access to
and dissemination of information in general and STI in par-
ticular are relatively weak, and there is little, if any, national
level control of social change. The West exhibits technolog-
ical strength and interest in all areas of communication and
computing and has a near-universal user community.
CHARACTERISTICS OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA
Centralized Communist Party rule has greatly influenced
scientific and technological R&D in the former Soviet Union.
Most R_D has been conducted in large, block-funded in-
stitutes [7, 34] that are characterized by a rigid hierarchy
of vertical control and are isolated from outside influences;
security departments play a significant role in the hierar-
chy. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Russian engineers and
scientists infrequently have the opportunity to meet each
other and international colleagues at conferences and to usc
print and electronic media to stay abreast of the latest de-
velopments in their fields. American engineers and scien-
tists typically enjoy greater autonomy than do their Russian
counterparts who frequently work under the direction of ad-
ministrators concerned with addressing political rather than
scientific issues. The Americans also have much easier and
more timely access to professional journals and equipment
required for their research than do the Russians.
Despite limitations and restrictions on Russian engineers
and scientists, the Communist Party placed a high value on
science and technology. Under Communist rule the Soviet
Union was a "technotopia" [8, 1]; the "Scientific and Techno-
logical Revolution" was touted as the solution to all the na-
tion's problems [9, 95]. Under the Brezhnev and Gorbachev
administrations, Soviet leadership prioritized the improve-
ment and application of computing and communications
technologies, allocating resources and creating new programs
as well as overtly and covertly transferring technology from
abroad [10, 537]. An obsessive concern with secrecy and na-
tional security, however, has impeded the kind of open per-
sonal communication, both intranationally and internation-
ally, that is required if science and technology are to thrive
[11, 2]. Fierce competition between institutes for funding
and recognition has hindered intranational communication.
International communication is almost non-existent because
of an unwillingness to reveal information to foreigners and a
fear of foreign sources corrupting Soviet scientists.
Restricted Participation in International Science
Soviet scientists seeking to attend conferences abroad
were frequently denied permission to do so by an artificially
lengthy application process to leave the country. Frequently
administrators delayed a decision until after the conference
date. As Popovsky points out, the loss is not just to So-
viet science, but to the entire international scientific com-
munity that could benefit from collegial exchanges of ideas
[12, 104-107]. The Communist Party's restrictions on travel
actually prevented the exchange of information that is nec-
essary if government-mandated scientific and technological
developments are to succeed. Furthermore, red-tape and
censorship have limited possibilities for the publication of
Soviet work in Western journals. Recently, however, the So-
viet government has begun to admit the harmful effects of
restricted communication on science and technology [13].
Another disadvantage hampering Russian engineers and
scientists is the extreme difficulty they have obtaining for-
eign journals. A shortage of hard currency has led to a
limited number of foreign journals being available to Rus-
sian engineers and scientists; the authorities who allocate
funds believe that foreign goods and physical technology are
more important than foreign technical and scientific publi-
cations. Although the former Soviet Union has the largest
P_D community in the world, they purchase only about one
half of the scientific books and journals sold abroad each
year [14, 24-25].
An even greater problem than the limited acquisition
of foreign journals is inefficient distribution. All journals
made available to Russian engineers and scientists must
first pass through the hands of censors, a process which
typically adds another six months to distribution time.
Prior to 1974 when the Soviet Union began adhering to the
International Copyright Convention which prohibits cover-
to-cover copying, foreign journals were actually cut apart by
secret police officials who then pasted up and photocopied
them in an expurgated form [15, 26].
Restricted Dissemination of Information Within
Soviet Science
In addition to the limited availability of foreign STI, in-
adequate serial publication of Soviet research affects the in-
tranational dissemination of STI. Russian engineers and sci-
entists frequently encounter problems getting their research
published. The number of journals is insufficient to support
the large number of researchers working in the Soviet Union.
From the early 1960s to the late lg70s, the number of scien-
tific workers grew to approximately 1,300,000. During that
same period, 82 new academic journals were created and 400
irregular serials were shut down. Then, in 1979 the Central
Committee adopted a resolution "On the Rationalization of
the Edition Sizes and Reduction of the Number of Period-
ical Publications" which caused 300 journals to be reduced
in size [16, 16-19].
The reduction was made because of paper shortages and
the low priority given to the allocation of resources for
scientific and technical publications. For this reason, when
articles do find their way into print, they are markedly
affected by the limited space available in existing journals.
The Journal of E.rwrimrntol _nd Theoretical Phy._ir., limits
submissions to 15 typed pages [17, 242]. Calculations and
details are often omitted in the interest of saving space,
and many Soviet journal articles are so abbreviated as to
appear to be written in code. The lack of modern facilities
for producing graphs and other visual supports for articles
has also detracted from the impact of the work of Soviet
researchers abroad [18, 171-173].
Soviet journals typically have limited press-ruus because
of restrictions on paper; reprints are very difficult to obtain
and preprints are virtually unknown [19, 37]. Since preprints
and conference presentations are two primary means for the
early dissemination of scientific and technical information,
Soviet scientists have faced considerable difficulty staying
abreast of developments in their fields. Writing as recently
as October 1992, Travica and Hogan point out that '_t may
seem remarkable to us how little individual Soviet scholars
and scientists know about each other and their work" [20,
130].
Limited Photocopying Facilities
Inadequate photocopying facilities and strict control on
access to photocopying have also limited the acquisition, use,
and dissemination of STI. The problem is so serious that a
special commission of the State Committee on Science and
Technology was charged with studying the question of rais-
ing the quality and output of copying machines [21, 62].
Better quality photocopying facilities have been introduced
more recently, but they are available only to the elite. When
reproductions are available at all, there is frequently a long
delay before they are produced. This problem, compounded
by a reluctance, now based on economic hardship, to pur-
chase a significant number of foreign journals and the delays
and inadequacies of publication in Soviet journals, renders a
large amount of STI, both foreign and domestic, inaccessible
to engineers and scientists.
Limited Computer Technology
Despite serious obstacles to the dissemination of informa-
tion through printed media, computing and the electronic
transfer of information is the area where the former Soviet
Union has lagged farthest behind Western nations [22, 116].
In 1985 the Soviet Politburo approved a plan to create, de-
velop, and use computer technology and automated manu-
facturing systems throughout the country by the year 2000;
however, specific details about this plan and other Five-Year-
Plan targets indicate that successful implementation of these
goals would not raise computing to late 1980s Western stan-
dards [23, 537-538]. Harley Baizer has correctly identified
computing as '%he AchiLles' heel of Soviet science" [24, 159].
Several factors have retarded the growth of computing in
the Soviet Union: an inability to establish serial production
of personal computers, the poor quality of telecommunica-
tious, and an electrical supply system subject to frequent
blackouts. Soviet computing has also been plagued by an
inadequate supply of peripheral devices, lagging software de-
velopment, and the incompatibility of existing models. Tape
cassettes and disks are expensive, and paper, ribbons, and
disks are in limited supply [25, 231-232].
Access to computing has been limited to the elite of
the scientific community. However, even where computing
facilities are available, their use has been circumscribed
by tight political control. Permission to print a program
or document, for example, would require several levels of
clearance. At most research institutes a scientific worker
would have to obtain written approval from as many as five
individuals before printing a document [26, 155].
Soviet leaders faced the contradiction that the very sci-
entific and technical progress that they strove for would
threaten the sociopolitical status quo. The Party feared
that widespread computing would facilitate the free flow of
information and thereby undermine national security and
state control. The role played by computer networks in the
failed 1991 Soviet coup demonstrates the validity of this
fear. "During the coup, the computer network became a
broadcasting operation. Networkers acting as unofficial cor-
respondents posted information and political commentary ....
Telecommunications network systems and information tech-
nology became a distributed publishing service -- a freedom
press" [27, 129].
Balzer predicted the need for a cultural change before
computing could be fully integrated into Soviet science [28,
201-202]. With the recent political changes we are, in fact,
seeing an increase in the free flow of information. Rapid
growth in the on-line information market is expected in the
1990s. Telecommunications are also expected to grow at an
unprecedented rate. Robert Noel, discussing the potential
for scientific communication and technology transfer with
Central Asia, stresses the new opportunities for scientists
and technical communicators in a climate of free information
flow [29,552].
However, despite the increased potential for scientific and
technological growth in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, we will examine the results of our survey bearing
in mind the climate of secrecy,strictcentralizedcontrol,
and limitedflowofscientificand technicalinformationwhich
have prevailedfor most of the working livesof our respon-
dents, and which have undoubtedly shaped and influenced
both theirtechnicalcommunication practicesand theiratti-
tudes toward technicalcommunication.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted at comparable aeronautical
research facilities, the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Insti-
tute (TsAGI), the NASA Ames Research Center and the
NASA Langley Research Center, using self-administered
(self-reported) mail surveys. The instrument used to col-
lect the data had been used previously in several Western
European countries and Japan and was adapted for use in
Russia. Russian language questionnaires were distributed
to 325 researchers at TsAGI, and 209 were received by the
established cut-off date for a completion rate of 64 percent.
English language questionnaires were distributed to 558 re-
searchers at the two NASA installations, and 340 were re-
ceived by the established cut-off date for a completion rate
of 61 percent. The survey at TsAGI was conducted during
April and May of 1992, and the surveys at the NASA centers
were conducted during July and August of 1992 [30].
PRESENTATION OF THE DATA
This paper presents selected results from the Russian and
U.S. studies. Demographic data are presented first, followed
by data about the time devoted to technical communication,
collaborative writing practices and attitudes toward collabo-
ration, the kinds of technical documents the survey respon-
dents produce and use, their use of computer/information
technology, and their use of and the importance to them of
libraries and technical information centers.
Demographic Information About the Survey
Respondents
Survey respondents were asked to provide information
regarding their professionalduties, years of professional
work experience, educational preparation, current profes-
sional duties, and gender. The two groups differsignifi-
cantly in terms of education, current duties, and profes-
sional/technicalsociety membership; they are similar in
years of professional work experience, organizational affili-
ation, educational preparation, and gender. The following
"composite" participant profiles were based on the demo-
graphic data. The Russian survey participantworks as a re-
searcher (77%), has a bachelor'sdegree (53%), was trainedat
an engineer (79%) but currentlyworks as a scientist(68%),
and has an average of 20 years professionalwork experience.
The U.S. survey participantworks as a researcher (82%),
has a graduate degree (73%), was trained as an engineer
(80%), currentlyworks as an engineer (69%), has an aver-
age of 17 years of professionalwork experience,and belongs
to a professional/technicalsociety (78%).
Time Spent Communicating Technical Information
In Russia scientificand technicalinformation has been
closelyguarded from outsiders[31,102]. Information trans-
ferhas been givena low priorityand many of the means that
are used in the United States to disseminate information,
such as electronicnetworks and teleconferencing,are not
widely available.Therefore,itisnot surprisingto findthat
American engineersand engineersspend more time than do
theirRussian counterparts in both oraland written commu-
nication of technicalinformation (table 1). When subjects
were asked how many hours per week they spend commu-
nicating technicalinformation, the median for Russian re-
spondents was 7 hours, compared to 15 hours for American
respondents.
Collaborative Writing Practices
Questions about collaborationon the production of writ-
ten technicalcommunications elicitedinterestingdifferences
between U.S. and Russian respondents. The differenceswere
relatedboth to collaborativewriting practicesand to the re-
spondents' perceptionsregarding the productivityofwriting
as part of a group. These differencesmay be understood in
lightof the highly collectivenature of Russian lifegenerally
and of work in research institutespecifically.Most Soviet
scientistsare part of research collectivesand work in small
groups that have fewer than ten members [32, 131]. The
individualhas been subjugated in Russia; it isnot unheard
of for junior colleaguesto be assigned to write a senior ad-
ministrator'sdissertation[33,48-49].
When asked what percentage (median) of their written
technicalcommunications involved writing alone, the Rus-
sianrespondents reported 20 percent as opposed to 70 per-
cent for American respondents. Both groups reported that
20 percent of written technicalcommunications were pre-
pared in collaborationwith one other person. Both groups
reported thatonly 10 percent of written technicalcommuni-
cationsinvolvedwriting ina group of fiveor more persons.
Table I. Mean (Median) Number of Hours Spent Each Week by
Russian and U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Communicating Technical Information
Communications Russia U.S.
Communication with Others
Working with Communications
Received from Others
8.75 (7.00)
hours/week
7.64 (6.00)
hours/week
16.95 (15.0)
hours/week
13.97 (12.0)
hours/week
Forty-four percent of the Russian respondents reported
that writing as part of a group is more productive than
writing alone, while only 33 percent of the U.S. respon-
dents found writing in a group more productive than writing
alone (table 2). Further, approximately eight percent of the
Russians reported that writing as part of a group is less pro-
ductive than writing alone as compared to 20 percent of the
Americans. Clearly the Russian and American respondents
have different perceptions of the productivity of writing as
part of a group.
Documents Prepared Most Frequently
There is little difference in the types of documents pro-
duced most frequently by Russian and U.S. respondents (ta-
ble 3). When writing alone and when writing as part of
a group, the documents that the Russian respondents pre-
pared most frequently were drawings/specifications, letters,
and memoranda. They infrequently prepared journal arti-
cles, audio/visual materials, technical manuals, and techni-
cal talks/presentations. As expected, they prepared no trade
or promotional literature. When preparing these documents
in a groups, the median number of people in the group was
either two or three (table 3).
When writing alone and when writing as part of a group,
the American respondents frequently prepared memoranda,
letters, audio/visual materials, and drawings and specifica-
tions. They infrequently prepared journal articles (table 4).
Given the very different emphasis placed on the commu-
nication of technical information in Russia, it is surprising
to find that the two groups produce the same types of doc-
uments. This finding contradicts our expectation that a
different perception of the importance of information dis-
semination would lead to different types of documents being
produced. This contradiction may be explained, in part, by
the fact that the documents most frequently produced by
both groups were letters and memoranda which are likely to
be the documents most frequently produced in any society.
Another contradiction in these findings is that both Rus-
sians and Americans reported that they infrequently pre-
pared journal articles. We may surmise that issues of secu-
rity and a limited number of journals publishing scientific
and technical information explain the infrequent production
of journal articles by the Russians. But that assumption
does not explain why the Americans infrequently prepare
journal articles. One reason for this finding may be the pro-
prietary nature of work in the aerospace industry even in
America.
Table 2. Influence of Group Participation on Writing Productivity
For Russian and U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Productivity
A Group Is More Productive Than Writing Alone
A Group Is About As Productive As Writing Alone
A Group Is Less Productive Than Writing Alone
I Only Write Alone
Russia
_0 (n)
44 (92)
41 (86)
s (17)
7 (14)
V.S.
(n)
33 (110)
32 (107)
2015 /_8/
Table 3. Mean (Median) Number of Technical Information Products
Produced in the Past Six Months by
Russian Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Information Products
Abstracts
Journal Articles
Conference/Meeting Papers
Trade/Promotional Literature
Drawings/Specifications
Audio/Visual Material
Letters
Memoranda
Technical Proposals
Technical Manuals
Computer Program
Documentation
In-house Technical Reports
Technical Talks/Presentations
Mean
6.13
1.43
2.00
0.00
8.29
1.50
6.24
6.46
3.03
1.67
5.73
2.76
1.70
Alone
Median
2.00
1.00
1.00
(0.00
5.00
1.50
5.00
3.00
(2.00
(1.00
2.00)
2.00)
(1.00)
In a Group
Mean Median
1.82 (1.50
1.48 (1.00
1.53 (1.00
3.00 (I.00
12.40 (2.00
4.43 (1.00
3.82 (2.00)
2.40 (2.50)
2.02 (2.00)
1.60 (1.00)
2.83 (1.50)
2.71 (2.00)
1.54 (1.00)
Average
Number of
Persons Per
Group
Mean Median
2.61 (2.0C
2.55 (2.oc
2.96 (2.0C
3.00 (3.0C
3.10 (2.0C
2.71 (2.0C
2.86 (2.0C
2.20 (2.00)
3.81 (3.00)
2.67 (ZOO)
2.50 (2.00)
3.65 (3.00)
2.52 (2.00)
When examining the production of technicalcommuni-
cation,we need to study other factors besides frequency of
production. In order to gain a hillerunderstanding of the
production of technicalcommunication in Russia, itwould
be helpfulto study other aspects of document production,
such as the amount of time spent on differentypes of docu-
ments, the document review process, and the role of collab-
oration.
Documents Used Most Frequently
We asked respondents to indicate the types of technical
documents they used most frequently in performing their
work. The Russian respondents most frequentlyused journal
articles,abstracts,letters,memoranda, and computer pro-
gram documentation. They leastfrequentlyuse audio/visual
materials, technical proposals, and trade/promotional liter-
ature (table 5).
In light of the difficulty Russian engineers and scientists
have obtaining journal articles, it is interesting to note
their frequent use of them as information sources. We can
only speculate on the effect of this difficulty on R&D in
Russia. Since Russians are relying on an incomplete, and
probably censored, body of journal articles, it is reasonable
to suppose their research is impeded to some extent and that
they spend time unnecessarily replicating experiments and
studies. Their reliance on in-house reports is consistent with
a pervasive control of external information as it is certain the
holdings of in-house libraries are restricted by administrators
and security departments. In fact, the in-house libraries at
Russian R&D organizations are not as well stocked as the
libraries at most major American universities [34, 125].
Table 4. Mean (Median) Number of Technical Information Products Produced in the Past Six Months by
U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Information Products
Abstracts
Journal Articles
Conference/Meeting Papers
Trade/Promotional Literature
Drawings/Speeifications
Audio/Visual Material
Letters
Memoranda
Technical Proposals
Technical Manuals
Computer Program Documentation
In-house Technical Reports
Technical Talks/Presentations
Mean
1.67
1.33
1.90
2.00
7.21
5.73
9.96
16.06
2.17
2.11
3.43
2.34
3.54
Alone
Median
(1.00)
(1.oo)
120)
1.00)
(3.00)
(4.00)(6.00
(9.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
220
In a Group
Mean Median
1.0(]
1.0(]
1.0(]
1.oc
(3.0C
(2.00
300)
3.50)
1.5o)
1.00)
1.50)
1.oo)
2.00)
Average
Number of
Persons Per
Group
Mean
1.81
1.75
1.54
1.00
3.83
5.82
5.95
5.14
2.64
2.11
2.20
1.80
3.07
2.67
2.74
2.79
2.50
3.02
2.95
2.32
2.55
2.61
3.11
2.35
2.87
3.46
Median
(2.00)
(2.00)
(3.00)
(2.50)(2.00)
(2.00)
(2.00)
(2.00)
(2.00)
(3.00)
(2.00)
(2.00)(3.00)
Table 5. Mean (Median) Number of Technical Information Products Used in the Past Six Months by
Russian and U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Information Products
Abstracts
Journal Articles
Conference/Meeting Papers
Trade/Promotional Literature
Drawings/Specifications
Audio/Visual Material
Letters
Memoranda
Technical Proposals
Technical Manuals
Computer Program Documentation
In-house Technical Reports
Technical Talks/Presentations
Mean
16.48
18.33
6.71
4.97
6.63
2.66
13.11
10.12
4.41
5.26
9.61
8.61
5.08
Russia
Median
t620
i7.50'
_3.00'
12.00'
5.00)
2.00)(8.00)
(5.50)
(3.00)
(3.00)
5.00)
5.00)
(3.00)
Mean
16.45
16.54
12.00
11.77
15.48
14.59
17.28
25.44
5.89
7.65
14.57
6.93
10.25
U.S.
Median
(10.00)
10.00)
lO.OO)
(6.00)(5.00)
(5.00)
(9.00:
(10.oo2.00'
,5.00'
5.00'
,5.00'
(6.00'
In contrast to the Russians, the U.S. respondents most
frequently use memoranda, letters, journal articles, abstracts,
and drawings/specifications. They least frequently use tech-
nical proposals, technical manuals, and in-honse technical
reports. Their reported frequent use of journal articles and
abstracts, suggests that these materials are readily available
to users who are aware of their existence and how to access
them.
Use Of Computer Technology
The easing of restrictions on STI now occurring are likely
to be aided by dramatic changes in computing in Russia
during this decade. At the time of this survey, Russia lagged
far behind the U.S. in computing. U.S. respondents reported
much greater use of computer technology than their Russian
counterparts reported. While approximately 72 percent
of Russian respondents do use word processing software,
they reported little use of other types of software; less
than 5 percent of Russian aerospace engineers and scientists
used desktop publishing compared to 48 percent of the U.S.
respondents (table 6).
A small percentage of the Russians reported using any in-
formation technologies in communicating technical informa-
tion. Less than 3 percent of the Russians indicated that they
used electronic mail, electronic bulletin boards, video confer-
encing, teleconferencing, laser disk/video disk/CD-ROM, or
electronic networks (table 7). The lack of use of these infor-
mation technologies is probably related to the strict control
of information. It is probably also related to problems with
the telecommunications system, electrical supply, serial pro-
duction of personal computers, and software development.
Table 6. Use of Computer Software by Russian and U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists to
Prepare Written Technical Communication
Software
Word Processing
Outlinersand Prompters
Grammar and StyleCheckers
SpellingCheckers
Thesaurus
Business Graphics
ScientificGraphics
Desktop Publishing
%
72
34
11
17
12
24
53
4
Russia
(n)
(150
(72
(26
(50)
(110)
(9)
%
96
14
30
88
37
15
91
48
V.S.
(n)
(327)
(46)
(103)
(299)
(127)
(52)
(308)
(162)
Table 7. Use, Nonuse, and Potential Use of Information Technologies by Russian
and U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Information Technologies
Audio Tapes and Cassettes
Motion Picture Film
Videotape
Desktop/Electronic Publishing
Computer Cassettes/Cartridge Tapes
Electronic Mail
Electronic Bulletin Boards/Cartridge Tapes
FAX or TELEX
Electronic Data Bases
Video Conferencing
Teleconferencing
Micrographics and Microforms
Laser Disk/Video Disk/CD-ROM
Electronic Networks
Already Use It
Russia U.S.
% %
12 13
20 17
15 63
5 6O
58 44
2 83
2 36
21 91
25 56
2 37
2 53
54 23
1 19
3 76
Don't Use It,
But May in
Future
Russia U.S.
% %
22 30
19 29
37 31
41 32
20 32
48 15
43 48
37 8
46 40
31 54
28 40
12 42
44 68
51 19
Don't Use It,
and Doubt If
Will
Russia U.S.
% %
34 57
28 55
19 7
14 8
3 24
11 2
10 17
9 1
6 4
33 10
32 7
9 34
17 14
12 5
7
A large percentage of Russian respondents not currently
using electronic media do expect to use them in the future.
This finding is consistent with the fact that both telecommu-
nications and the on-line information market are expected
to grow at a rapid rate in the 1990s. In fact, information
technology is one area where information control could only
be practiced at the expense of scientific and technological
progress [37, 551].
Use of Libraries and Technical Information Centers
Almost all of the respondents indicated that their organi-
zation has a library or technical information center. Unlike
the U.S. respondents (9%), about 45 percent of the Russian
respondents indicated that the library or technical informa-
tion center was located in the building where they worked.
About 53 percent of the Russian and 88 percent of the U.S.
respondents indicated that the library or technical informa-
tion center was outside the building in which they worked
and that it was located nearby where they worked. For about
49 percent of the Russians, the library or technical informa-
tion center was located 1.4 kilometers or less from where they
worked. For about 81 percent of the U.S. respondents, the
library or technical information center was located 1.0 mile
or less from where they worked.
Respondents were asked to indicate the number of times
they had visited their organization's library or technical
information center in the past 6 months (table 8). Overall,
the Russian respondents used their organization's library or
technical information center more than the U.S. respondents
used theirs. The average use rate for Russian aerospace
engineers and scientists was _: = 12.5 during the past
6 months compared to X = 9.2 for the U.S. aerospace
engineers and scientists. The median 6-month use rates for
the two groups were 10.0 and 4.0, respectively.
Respondents were also asked to rate the importance of
their organization's library or technical information center
(table 9). Importance was measured on a 5-point scale
with 1 -- not at all important and 5 = very important. A
majority of both groups indicated that their organization's
library or technical information center was important to per-
forming their present professional duties. About 83 percent
of the Russian aerospace engineers and scientists indicated
that their organization's library or technical information
center was very important to performing their present pro-
fessional duties. About 68 percent of the U.S. aerospace
engineers and scientists indicated that their organization's
library or technical information center was very important
to performing their present professional duties. About 2 per-
cent of the Russian respondents and about 13 percent of the
U.S. respondents indicated that their organization's library
or technical information center was very unimportant to per-
forming their present professional duties.
Table 8. Use of the Organization's Library in Past 6 Months
by Russian and U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Visits
0 times
1 - 5 times
6- 10 times
11 - 25 times
26- 50 times
51 or more times
Does not have a library
Russian
% (n)
4 (9)
31 (65)
34 (71)
19 (40)
6 (13)
2 (5
3 (6/
%
11
43
21
14
7
1
3
V.S.
Mean 12.5 9.2
Median 10.0 4.0
(n)
(37)
(145)
73)
49)
(22)
Table 9. Importance of the Organization's Library
to Russian and U.S. Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
Importance
Very Important
Neither Important nor Unimportant
Very Unimportnant
Does not have a library
Russian
% (n)
82.8 (173)
12.4 (26)
2.0 (4)
2.8 (6)
%
68.3
15.6
12.9
3.2
C.S.
(n)
(232)
(53)
(44)
(11)
DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the dissemi-
nation of STI within it was strictly controlled, and commu-
nication between Russian engineers and scientists and their
foreign counterparts was highly restricted. Although sweep-
ing political changes in the former Soviet Union have led to
a relatively free flow of international STI, the lasting effects
of the former working environment and of the corresponding
Soviet information model that has prevailed since 1917 can-
not be discounted. Our analysis of the performance and op-
eration of science and technology in this environment leads
to the following tentative conclusions.
1. Because of a tradition of strict control ez-
erred by the Communist Party over STI, Russian
aerospace engineers and scientists can be expected
to spend less time communicating STI than their
U.S. counterparts spend.
Data contained in table 2 support this conclusion. The
Russian aerospace engineers and scientists in this study
spend about half the time that their U.S. counterparts spend
communicating with others and working with communica-
tions they receive from others. They devote only 41 per-
cent of a 40-hour work week to technical communication,
compared to 77 percent for their U.S. counterparts. Only
30 percent of the Russian respondents indicated that they
had increased the amount of time they spend communicat-
ing STI over the past five years, whereas 70 percent of the
U.S. respondents reported spending more time communicat-
ing STI during the same time. In fact, 29 percent of the
Russian respondents noted a decrease in the amount of time
they spent communicating technical information, compared
to 6 percent of the U.S. respondents.
_. Given a cultural tradition of valuing collective
efforts over individual efforts, Russian aerospace
engineers and scientists might be expected to em-
phasize the importance of collaboratively produced
technical communication to a greater degree than
do their U.S. counterparts. We found no evidence
of this.
Writing appears to be a collaborative process for both
groups of respondents. Although no statistical tests were
performed, there appears to be little difference between Rus-
sian and U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists and either
their collaborative writing practices or their production of
written technical communication as a function of the number
of groups and group size. However, this lack of a real differ-
ence between the two groups in their collaborative writing
practices and their production of technical communication
may well be attributable to the nature of engineering work
itself. Engineering work requires engineers to function as
teams and to share their knowledge and the results of their
work with others in order to create products. It is interesting
to note, however, that only 8 percent of the Russian respon-
dents (compared to 33% of the U.S. respondents) indicated
that group writing is more productive than writing alone;
44 percent of the Russian respondents (and 20% of the U.S.
respondents) actually found group writing less productive
than writing alone.
3. Given a fundamental difference between
Russian and U.S. approaches to the conduct of sci-
ence and technology (i.e., centralized vs. deeentral-
ized), shortages of paper, and limited access to in-
formation resources, differences in the production
and use of technical information products can be
expected between Russian and U.S. aerospace engi-
neers and scientists.
Data contained in tables 3 and 4 (production) and table 5
(use) support this tentative conclusion. Shortages of hard
currency and paper, limited availability of printing and re-
production equipment, and censorship would limit the abil-
ity of Russian aerospace engineers and scientists to produce
documents and scientists to produce documents and make
presentations. The effects of information control, the low
priority given to funding the acquisition of print and non-
print STI, and Western nations' restrictions on the transfer
of STI to the former Soviet-bloc countries combine to limit
the access to acquisition and use of STI by Russian aerospace
engineers and scientists.
4. Given that the former Soviet Union lagged be-
hind the West in computer and information tech-
nology, the patterns of computer and information
technology use among Russian aerospace engineers
and scientists can be expected to demonstrate a
similar lag.
Data contained in table 7 support this assumption. As
a framework for discussion, the computer and information
technologies contained in table 7 may be placed in into
three categories: mature, maturing, and nascent. Russian
aerospace engineers and scientists make greater use of the
mature computer and information technologies (e.g., com-
puter cassettes and cartridge tapes) than they do of the ma-
turing (e.g., desktop publishing) and nascent (e.g., electronic
networks) ones.
The growth of computing in the former Soviet Union has
been hampered by insufficient production and support ca-
pabilities for hardware, inadequate software and peripherals
development, and limited computer supplies. In addition,
the poor quality of Soviet telecommunications and the in-
consistency of the electrical supply system exacerbate the
situation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite the limitations of this investigation, these findings
contribute to our knowledge and understanding of the tech-
nical communication practicesamong aerospace engineers
and scientistsat the national and internationallevels.The
primary data elicitedby this kind of questionnaire-based
research speak to a number of current areas of scholarly
and professionalinterest,both within the fieldof techni-
cal communication, and within a number of related fields--
information science, engineering education, public policy,
rhetoric,and composition, to name just a few. Here are five
of the interestingquestions our research invitespracticing
engineers, scientists, scholars, teachers, and R&D managers
to ask:
1. How does government policy toward the flow
of STI shape the technical communication practices
of scientists and engineers? There is evidence in this
Russian study to suggest that the tightly controlled commu-
nication practices of the former USSR had a profound ef-
fect, one that has outlasted the government that created it.
While other countries may not have policies as transparently
differentfromthat of the U.S. as the Soviet Union's, there
are still undoubtedly differences.As thisRussian study sug-
gests,the effects of those differences are expressed in ways
an uninformed outsider might not anticipate. Knowing more
about each government's policy towards the flow of STI can
thus help anyone involved in international work in two ways:
(1) to better anticipate possible areas of misunderstanding
due to such differences, and (2) to take advantage of differ-
ences that produce vigor.
2. How do cultural differences shape the flow of
STI? Beyond a government's official policies, there are the
broader cultures--the language itself, the workplace, the
profession, the role of the worker in society, and so on--
that change from country to country. The ways in which
they shape the flow of STI in the U.S. are becoming better
and better known, but little is known in the U.S. about how
other countries' cultural differences shape the flow of STI
there.
3. What implications do these findings hold for
those who may one day find themselves teaching
people from countries such as Russia to create
their own technical documents in English? Not
only does the flood of non-U.S, graduate students into
U.S. universities continue to grow, but today an increasing
number of U.S. teachers are going to foreign countries to
teach writing. Along with many elements of second-language
teaching that are already known, the differences spotlighted
in this and similar studies need to be taken into account in
such teaching.
4. What implications do these findings and those
of similar studies have for those who find them-
selves working collaboratively on projects with sci-
entists and engineers from such countries? Witness,
for example, Germany's, Spain's, Italy's, and Great Britain's
$34 billion joint production of a fighter aircraft, Japan's par-
ticipation in the production of Boeing's 767, and the Interna-
tional Aero Engines (IAE) Consortium led by Rolls-Royce
and Pratt and Whitney. Boeing has recently proposed a
"joint venture" with the Russian Central Hydro-dynamics
Institute (TsAGI) that could result in U.S. aerospace en-
gineers' and scientists' working directly with their Russian
counterparts. The success of the Boeing/TsAGI effort will
depend, to some extent, on how effectively Russian and
U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists acquire, process, and
communicate STI within a collaborativeframework, given a
number of presumed culturaland institutionaldifferencesin
theircommunication practices.
Finally, we close by posing three more questions that
address problems inherent in international communication.
How do country-by-country differences impact on the pro-
duction, transfer, and use of STI and the various classes of
data flowing acrossnational boundaries? What stepscan be
taken to facilitatecommunication at the individual,organi-
zational,national,and internationallevelsand ensure itsef-
fectivemanagement? What safeguardswillcountriesimpose
on information dissemination to protectnationalsovereignty,
and what rolewillinformation standards play in the inter-
national dissemination of information?
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